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The SVAR and narrative approaches to estimating tax multipliers deliver significantly different results.
The former yields multipliers of about 1 percent, whereas the latter produces much larger multipliers
of about 3 percent. The SVAR and narrative approaches differ along two important dimensions: the
identification scheme and the reduced-form transmission mechanism. This paper uses a DSGE-model
approach to evaluate the hypothesis that the different tax multipliers stemming from the SVAR and
narrative approaches are due to differences in the assumed reduced-form transmission mechanisms.
The main finding of the paper is that in the context of the DSGE model employed this hypothesis is
rejected. Instead, the observed differences in estimated multipliers are due either to both models failing
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The recent empirical literature has delivered two main approaches to estimating tax mul-
tipliers. The ﬁrst one, pioneered by the work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002), is based
on a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) analysis. The second strand of the empirical
literature, initiated by the work of Romer and Romer (2007), estimates tax shocks using
a narrative approach and then regresses a measure of aggregate activity, such as GDP, on
current and lagged values of the identiﬁed tax shock.
The motivation of this paper is that the SVAR and narrative approaches deliver sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent estimates of the size of the tax multiplier. The former approach yields
relatively small values of less than 1 percent, whereas the latter delivers large values of about
3 percent. That is, a cut in taxes equivalent to 1 percent of output generates an increase in
output of less than 1 percent according to the SVAR approach but a 3 percent increase in
output according to the narrative approach.
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that the two approaches diﬀer along
two dimensions. One dimension is the assumed reduced-form transmission mechanism. The
transmission mechanism invoked by the SVAR approach consists of a multi-equation, multi-
variate autoregressive system in which taxes evolve jointly with other endogenous variables.
By contrast, the transmission mechanism proposed by the narrative approach involves a
single equation expressing output as a linear function of current and past values of the
exogenous tax shock.
The second dimension along which the SVAR and narrative approaches diﬀer is, of course,
the identiﬁcation scheme. The SVAR approach imposes a number of restrictions to identify
the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of fundamental shocks (one of which is the tax
shock), given information on the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of estimated re-
duced form residuals. By contrast, the identiﬁcation scheme in Romer and Romer (2007) uses
a narrative approach consisting in analyzing written historical records, including presiden-
tial speeches, executive-branch documents, and congressional reports, to identify exogenous
1changes in tax liabilities.
A natural question that emerges from the above analysis is whether the signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences in the size of tax multipliers stemming from the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer
empirical models are due to diﬀerences in their transmission mechanisms or to fundamen-
tal diﬀerences in the tax shocks they identify. The goal of the present investigation is to
evaluate the hypothesis that the diﬀerences in tax multipliers are due to the diﬀerent trans-
mission mechanisms, taking as given the ability of both models to identify exogenous tax
shocks. To this end, we build an optimizing dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model featuring a number of exogenous shocks and real rigidities that have been shown to
be important for ﬁtting the U.S. postwar business cycle. We use the DSGE model as our
data-generating process to estimate the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer empirical mod-
els under the assumption that the econometrician successfully identiﬁes the structural tax
shocks. Fulﬁllment of this assumption is impossible to guarantee in empirical studies, but
trivial to satisfy in our theoretical environment. This, in fact, is our main methodological
contribution to the ﬁscal-multiplier debate.
Our main ﬁnding is that the hypothesis posited above is rejected within our data gener-
ating process. Conditional on correctly identifying the exogenous tax shock, the Blanchard-
Perotti and Romer-Romer models deliver on average remarkably good approximations to
the true impulse response of output to an exogenous innovation in factor income tax rates.
Consequently, both models also deliver average tax multipliers that are in line with the
‘true’ one—i.e., the one implied by the DSGE model. This ﬁnding suggests that the sharp
diﬀerence in the size of the tax multiplier implied by the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-
Romer models when estimated on actual data may be due to small sample uncertainty or
to the fact that their associated identiﬁcation schemes uncover fundamentally diﬀerent ﬁscal
shocks or both. We explore the role of small sample uncertainty conditional on the correct
identiﬁcation of the underlying tax shock in the context of our data generating process. We
ﬁnd that for samples of size similar to the length of the postwar period, small sample errors
2are signiﬁcant. In fact, short sample uncertainty can explain the totality of the observed
diﬀerences in estimated tax multipliers.
The remainder of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 develops the DSGE
model that serves as our data generating process. Section 3 contains the main result of the
paper. It estimates the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models using artiﬁcial data
and compares the resulting tax multiplier to the true one stemming from the DSGE model.
Section 4 studies the eﬀects of introducing anticipated shocks in the DSGE model on the
ability of the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models to uncover the true tax multiplier.
Section 5 analyzes the consequences of ﬁnite samples on the variance of the estimated tax
multipliers. Section 6 studies the hybrid reduced-form model of Favero and Giavazzi (2010),
which combines elements of the VAR and narrative approaches. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Data Generating Process
The DSGE model that we use as our data generating process is an augmented version of
the one proposed by Mertens and Ravn (2009). The main diﬀerence with the Mertens-Ravn
model is that our framework includes a number of additional structural shocks customarily
used in the quantitative business-cycle literature. Speciﬁcally, our model is driven by four
shocks: income-tax shocks, government spending shocks, neutral productivity shocks, and
preference shocks. The model distinguishes between durable and nondurable consumption
and features four real rigidities: habit formation, adjustment costs in investment, adjustment
cost in durable consumption, and variable capacity utilization. This class of model has been
shown in several recent studies to ﬁt well the postwar U.S. business cycle along a number
of dimensions, including output, consumption, investment, hours worked, and tax revenues
(see Mertens and Ravn, 2009; and Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe, 2010a, 2010b).
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households that seek to maxi-














































Ct + It + Dt + Gt = Wtnt(1 − τ
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Kτt+1 =( 1− δτ)Kτt+ It,
where Xt is a composite good made of nondurable consumption and services derived from
a stock of durable consumption goods, Ct denotes consumption of nondurables, Vt denotes
the stock of durables, Dt denotes purchases of durable goods, nt denotes hours worked, Zt
is a deterministic log-linear trend growing at the (gross) rate γz, µt denotes a stochastic
preference shock, Kt is the capital stock, It denotes gross investment, ut denotes capital
capacity utilization, Wt denotes the real wage rate, rt denotes the rental rate of capital, Gt
denotes government spending, τn
t and τk
t denote, respectively, labor and capital income tax
rates, Ft are lump-sum transfers received from the government, and Kτt denotes a measure
of the capital stock used by the ﬁscal authority to calculate the depreciation allowance.
Note that the depreciation rate used for tax purposes may not equal the economic rate of
depreciation (δτ 6= δk).
Firms purchase labor and capital services to produce a single perishable good, Yt,b y




Firms are assumed to be perfectly competitive in product and factor markets. They choose
input quantities to maximize proﬁts, given by Yt −Wtnt −rtutKt, subject to the production
technology given above.
The government is assumed to hold no debts or assets at any time. Lump-sum transfers
are assumed to adjust endogenously each period to ensure budget balance. The government
budget constraint is therefore given by
Gt + Ft = τ
n
t Wtnt + τ
k
t (rtutKt − δτKτt).



































t is an i.i.d. innovation with mean zero and standard deviation στ, and τn and
τk denote, respectively, the deterministic-steady-state values of τn
t and τk
t . Note that the
innovation ￿τ
t is common to both processes.
The laws of motion of the remaining three driving forces are as follows:







lnat = ρa lnat−1 + ￿
a
t,
where gt ≡ Gt/Zt denotes the detrended level of government spending, g denotes the






t are i.i.d. with mean zero and standard deviations σµ,σ g, and σa, respectively.
The time unit in the model is meant to be one quarter. The calibration of the model
follows closely Mertens and Ravn (2009), who estimate the structural parameters of the
model to match observed impulse responses of a number of macroeconomic variables to tax
shocks. For more details regarding the parameterization of the model, we refer the reader
to the work of Mertens and Ravn (2009). Our model requires the calibration of a number of
parameters that are not present in the Mertens-Ravn model, namely, the parameters deﬁning
the stochastic processes of preference shocks, government spending shocks, and productivity
shocks, and the volatility of tax shocks. We set the serial correlations of preference and
government spending shocks at 0.9 and the serial correlation of the technology shock at 0.95,
which are values in the range used in business-cycle analysis. All of the results of this paper
are invariant to proportional changes in the standard deviations of all shocks. We therefore
arbitrarily normalize the standard deviation of the technology shock at one percent and set
the standard deviations of the remaining three shocks to ensure that the share of the variance
of output explained by tax shocks, government spending shocks, productivity shocks, and
preference shocks be, respectively, 20, 10, 35, and 35 percent. Table 1 summarizes the
calibration of the model.
6Table 1: Calibration
Parameter Value Memo
α 0.36 technology parameter
γz 1.005 gross growth rate
βγ1−σ
z 1.03−1/4 growth-adjusted discount factor
δk 0.025 depreciation rate of capital
δv 0.025 depreciation rate of durables
Ψ0
k(1) 0.0375 marginal cost of capacity utilization
ν 0.8557 preference parameter
ω 249.35 preference parameter
sg 0.201 share of government spending in GDP
δτ 0.05 ﬁscal depreciation rate
τk 0.42 capital income tax rate
τn 0.26 labor income tax rate
σ 2.572 preference parameter
b 0.822 habit formation
κ 0.355 preference parameter
Φ00
v(γz) 4.444 adjustment costs durables
Φ00
k(γz) 6.581 adjustment costs investment
Ψ00
k(1)/Ψ0
k(1) 0.367 capacity utilization
ρn
1 0.999 labor-income tax rate
ρn
2 0 labor-income tax rate
ρk
1 1.629 capital income tax rate
ρk
2 -0.652 capital income tax rate
ρµ 0.9 preference shock
ρg 0.9 government spending shock
ρa 0.95 technology shock
στ 0.0031 std. dev. of tax shock
σµ 0.0308 std. dev. of preference shock
σg 0.0565 std. dev. of government spending shock
σa 0.01 std. dev. of technology shock
73 A Model-Based Test of the Transmission-Mechanism
Hypothesis
We wish to evaluate the hypothesis that, assuming the correct identiﬁcation of tax shocks,
the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models identify diﬀerent transmission mechanism
of tax shocks on output. Using the DSGE model of the previous section as the data generating
process, we estimate the transmission mechanisms associated with the Blanchard-Perotti and
Romer-Romer models. In so doing, we use our knowledge of the shocks driving the model
economy to leave completely aside the issue of identiﬁcation.
3.1 Estimating the Blanchard-Perotti Transmission Mechanism
on Artiﬁcial Data
To estimate the Blanchard-Perotti reduced-form transmission mechanism, we draw a sample
of 1,000 quarters of the four disturbances of the model to produce time series for ˆ yt ≡ ln(yt/y),
ˆ τt ≡ ln(τt/τ), and ˆ gt ≡ ln(gt/g), denoting, respectively, the log-deviations from steady
state of detrended output, yt ≡ Yt/Zt, detrended tax revenues, τt ≡ Tt/Zt, and detrended
government spending, gt ≡ Gt/Zt. Tax revenues are given by Tt ≡ τn
t Wtnt + τk
t (rtutKt −
δτKτt). The parameters y, τ, and g denote the steady-state values of yt, τt, and gt.W e
keep only the last 250 observations of each artiﬁcial time series, which roughly corresponds
to the length of the postwar period, and discard the initial 750 observations. Our choice
of variables used for estimation is guided by the observation that in their empirical model
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) include output, tax revenues, and government spending.























Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we posit that the reduced form shock ut is related





















We note that because the DSGE model features four structural innovations and the size of
the VAR is three, the elements of ￿t cannot be interpreted as structural. Nevertheless, as
stated earlier, our exercise consists in taking for granted the identiﬁcation of tax shocks and
examines instead the ability of the estimated VAR system to propagate that type of shock.
To this end, we identify ￿1
t with the tax shock and set the ﬁrst column of the matrix B
equal to the impact eﬀect of a unit increase in ￿τ
t on the vector Xt in the DSGE model. In
other words, the restriction we impose on the VAR system imply that the impulse responses
of output, tax revenues, and government spending implied by the DSGE and VAR models
are identical in the initial period. In subsequent periods, the true and estimated impulse
responses will in general be diﬀerent.
We replicate this exercise 1,000 times and report the average impulse responses of tax
revenues and output to an innovation in ￿τ
t that raises tax revenues by one percent of steady-
state output on impact.
Figure 1 displays with blue solid lines the impulse responses of tax revenue and output
to a tax innovation implied by the DSGE model. The ﬁgure shows with red broken lines
9Figure 1: Impulse Response to a Tax Innovation in the DSGE and Blanchard-Perotti Models

















































































the corresponding mean impulse response functions implied by the Blanchard-Perotti model
estimated using artiﬁcial data. By construction, the impulse responses implied by the DSGE
and the Blanchard-Perotti models are identical on impact. The Blanchard-Perotti empirical
model does a good job at tracing the propagation of the tax shock on output. Both in
the DSGE and in the Blanchard-Perotti models output displays an inverted hump-shaped
contraction. The trough in output is slightly less pronounced and occurs about a two quarters
earlier (quarter 9 versus quarter 11) in the Blanchard-Perotti model. We measure the tax
multiplier as the maximum drop in output divided by the initial increase in taxes. In the
ﬁgure, the response of tax revenue is measured as a percentage of steady-state output, and
the response of output is measured in percent deviations from its steady-state value. This
means that the tax multiplier coincides with the magnitude of the trough in the output
response. The tax multiplier predicted by the both the DSGE and the Blanchard-Perotti
models is about 1.8 percent.
We conclude that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of the tax shock, the Blanchard-
Perotti reduced-form model does a good job at replicating the propagation of such shocks.
103.2 Estimating the Romer-Romer Transmission Mechanism on
Artiﬁcial Data
Following the same logic as in the previous subsection, we continue to assume that the
econometrician has correctly identiﬁed exogenous innovations in taxes. We therefore use the
artiﬁcial time series generated from the DSGE model (and used in the previous section) to






t−i + ut, (1)
where both ˆ yt and ￿τ
t are equilibrium realizations of output and tax disturbances generated
from the DSGE model and ut is the residual of the regression.
Before proceeding to the estimation of the Romer-Romer equation on artiﬁcial data, we
wish to show that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of tax innovations, the OLS
estimates of the parameters Ci for i =0 ,...,12, deliver unbiased estimates of the impact
and subsequent 12 points of the true impulse response function of output to a tax innovation.























All of the innovations on the right-hand side of this expression are independent of one
another. Comparing this expression with the Romer-Romer model, equation (1), we have
that























It follows that ut is uncorrelated with ￿τ
t−i for i =0 ,1,...,12. As a result, the OLS estimate
of Ci in the Romer-Romer model of equation (1) is unbiased for i =0 ,1,...,12. Because in
11Figure 2: Impulse Response to a Tax Innovation in the DSGE and Romer-Romer Models

















































































our DSGE model the trough of the impulse response function of output to a tax innovation
occurs before period 12, it follows that the estimates of the Romer-Romer reduced-form
transmission mechanism of equation (1) deliver unbiased estimates of the tax multiplier.
The OLS estimate of Ci is, however, not eﬃcient because the vector ut is serially correlated.
We explore this issue further in section 5.
Figure 2 displays the responses of tax revenues and output to an innovation in taxes
in the DSGE and Romer-Romer models. The Romer-Romer impulse responses correspond
to the average of 1,000 estimates of equation (1). The Romer-Romer reduced-form model
captures almost perfectly the true impulse response functions. In particular, it replicates the
true tax multiplier of 1.8 in period 11.
To preserve comparison with the Blanchard-Perotti model, we have estimated a version of
the Romer-Romer model in which the explained variable is the level of output. The original
Romer-Romer model, however, features the growth rate of output as the independent variable







12Figure 3: Impulse Response to a Tax Innovation in the DSGE and Diﬀerence-Romer-Romer
Models

















































































We note that our DSGE model implies that the growth rate of output possesses an MA(∞)
representation in the four structural shocks. Consequently, by the same argument given
in discussing the properties of the Romer-Romer model in levels, we have that an OLS
estimation of the Romer-Romer model in growth rates delivers unbiased estimates of the
coeﬃcients Di for i =0 ,1,...,12. As a corollary, the OLS estimator also delivers an unbiased
estimate of the tax multiplier at any horizon below 12 quarters.
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses of tax revenues and the level of output to a tax
innovation implied by the DSGE model and by the Romer-Romer model estimated using
output growth as the independent variable. The ﬁgure shows that the Romer-Romer model
in growth rates, like its counterpart in levels, captures nearly perfectly the transmission of
tax shocks to output. In particular, the Romer-Romer model estimated using the growth
rate of output uncovers the correct tax multiplier of 1.8 percent. For the remainder of the
paper, we focus on the Romer-Romer model featuring the level of output as the dependent
variable.
133.3 Evaluation of the Transmission-Mechanism Hypothesis
We have shown that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of the exogenous tax distur-
bances, the average transmission mechanisms invoked by the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-
Romer reduced-form models yield virtually identical tax multipliers, which, in turn, are in
line with the true multiplier associated with the DSGE data generating process. We take this
result as suggesting two alternative explanations for the fact that empirical estimates of the
Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models deliver signiﬁcantly diﬀerent tax multipliers.
One possible explanation is that actual estimated tax multipliers are diﬀerent because of
small-sample undertainty. We explore this hypothesis in detail in section 5. A second possi-
ble explanation is that the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer regression models identify
fundamentally diﬀerent tax disturbances.
4 Anticipation
We have established that conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of tax innovations, both the
Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models satisfactorily capture the transmission mecha-
nism of tax disturbances. We now explore whether this continues to be the case when the
DSGE model is assumed to be driven by anticipated and unanticipated shocks. Schmitt-
Groh´ e and Uribe (2010a) argue that at least half of the variance of output and other macro-
economic aggregates are driven by anticipated shocks. Mertens and Ravn (2009) argue that
37 out of the 70 exogenous tax liability changes identiﬁed by Romer and Romer (2007)
are indeed anticipated, with a median anticipation horizon of six quarters. Anticipation
can potentially aﬀect the ability of both the Blanchard-Perotti model and the Romer and
Romer model to capture the transmission mechanism of ﬁscal shocks. In the case of the
Blanchard-Perotti model, the VAR system is estimated using data driven by both antici-
pated and unanticipated shocks. In the case of the Romer-Romer model, the econometrician
regresses output onto a tax shock that is the sum of a purely unanticipated component and
14a component that was announced in the past.
To introduce anticipation into the DSGE model, we assume the following speciﬁcation








for x = τ,µ,g,a. We assume that νx0
t and νx6
t are distributed independently of each other and
across time with mean 0 and standard deviation σx0 and σx6, respectively. The innovation νx0
t
is announced in period t and materializes in period t. That is, νx0
t is a purely unanticipated
shock. The innovation νx6
t is announced in period t and materializes in period t + 6. That
is, νx6
t is a disturbance anticipated six quarters. We pick six quarters of anticipation for tax
shocks based on the ﬁnding of Mertens and Ravn (2009) referred to above. Schmitt-Groh´ e
and Uribe (2010b) present econometric evidence of anticipation in technology, government
spending, and preference shocks at horizons 4 and 8 quarters. For simplicity, we arbitrarily
assume anticipation horizons of six quarters for these three shocks.




a(= 0.012). We also assume that tax shocks, government spending shocks, and preference
shocks explain, respectively 20, 10, and 35 percent of the variance of output. Finally, we
assume that the variance of each shock is explained in equal parts by its anticipated and its
unanticipated components, that is, σ2
x0 = σ2
x6 for x = τ,g,µ,a.
Figure 4 displays with solid lines the impulse responses to a surprise tax shock in the
DSGE model. Given that the model is approximated up to ﬁrst order, these responses are
identical to those corresponding to the DSGE model featuring only unanticipated shocks.
The ﬁgure displays with broken lines the responses of the Blanchard-Perotti (top panels)
and Romer-Romer (bottom panels) models. As before, each model is estimated 1,000 times
on artiﬁcial data of length 250 quarter generated by the DSGE model, with 750 burn-in
periods.
15Figure 4: Impulse Response to a Tax Innovation in the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer
Models when the DSGE Model is Driven by Anticipated and Unanticipated Shocks


































































































































































16In the case of the Blanchard-Perotti model, we continue to assume that the econometri-
cian is able to identify the impact response of output and tax revenues to an unanticipated
tax shock. The coeﬃcients of the VAR, however, are estimated using data from the DSGE
model driven by anticipated and unanticipated disturbances in taxes, preferences, technology,
and government spending. The ﬁgure shows that on average the Blanchard-Perotti model is
able to capture quite well the true impulse response functions. In particular, it delivers an
average tax multiplier of about 1.8, which is in line with its theoretical counterpart.












t, which is the total innovation in taxes materialized in period
t. This is the correct regression for the Romer-Romer model, because the econometrician is
not assumed to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated tax disturbances. In spite
of the assumed inability of the econometrician to isolate the unanticipated tax innovation,
the regression recovers remarkably well the true impulse response to an unanticipated tax
shock. In particular, the estimated Romer-Romer model correctly predicts an average tax
multiplier of 1.8 percent.
We note that, unlike in the economy driven only by unanticipated shocks, in the economy
under study here, the Romer-Romer regression does not have a theoretical underpinning.
To see this, note that the MA(∞) representation of ˆ yt implied by the DSGE model with
















where in this equation the term labeled ‘rest’ is orthogonal to the anticipated and unantici-
pated tax disturbances that appear on the right hand side.
By regressing ˆ yt onto ντ0
t−i + ντ6
t−6−i, the Romer-Romer regression incorrectly imposes the
17Figure 5: Tax Coeﬃcients in the MA(∞) Representation of Output
















i+6 for i =0 ,1,...,12. Theoretically, these two coeﬃcients are not
identical. However, as can be seen in ﬁgure 5, numerically in the DSGE model under study
these two coeﬃcients are quite similar. As a result, the Romer-Romer model does not miss
by much the magnitude of the multiplier to an unanticipated tax shock (see the bottom-right
panel of ﬁgure 4). The economic reason for the similitude of the MA coeﬃcients C0
i and C6
i+6
is that, given the state of the economy (i.e., given the levels of capital, habits, durable goods,
past investment, and the levels of the exogenous shocks) the economy responds equally to a
purely unanticipated shock that occurs in the current period and to a shock that materializes
in the current period but was announced in the past.
The results presented in this section, suggest that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation
of tax innovations, both the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models provide on average
an adequate reduced-form description of the underlying transmission mechanism of ﬁscal
shocks and a fairly precise estimate of the tax multiplier. The success of both empirical
models occurs in spite of the fact that half of the variance of the data generated by the
DSGE model is explained by six-quarter anticipated shocks. This result further strengthens
18the main thesis of this paper, namely, that the diﬀerences in tax multipliers implied by
estimates of the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer models on actual data might be due
to factors other than the transmission mechanisms that these models invoke.
5 Small Sample Uncertainty and Tax Multipliers
Thus far we have concentrated attention on the average responses of the Blanchard-Perotti
and Romer-Romer models to tax shocks. These averages were taken over 1,000 samples of
artiﬁcial data, each 250 quarters long. As explained earlier, the sample size of 250 quarters is
meant to roughly capture the length of the postwar period. We now address the issue of small
sample uncertainty. This analysis will allow us to answer questions such as how likely it is to
observe within a ﬁnite sample of 250 quarters an estimate of the Romer-Romer tax multiplier
that exceeds the Blanchard-Perotti multiplier by two percentage points, conditional on the
correct identiﬁcation of the tax shock. The diﬀerence of two percentage points reﬂects the
diﬀerence between the two multipliers when estimated on actual U.S. postwar data.
We characterize the distribution of tax multipliers at horizons 10, 11, and 12 quarters.
The tax multiplier at horizon 11, for instance, is deﬁned as the percentage deviation of
output from steady state in period 11 triggered by an increase in tax revenues in period 1
equivalent to 1 percent of output. We focus on horizons 10, 11, and 12 quarters because in
our assumed data generating process the maximum contraction in output in response to an
exogenous unanticipated tax innovation occurs in quarter 11.
The top panel of table 2 displays summary statistics of tax multipliers obtained from 1000
samples of 250 quarters of artiﬁcial data generated using the DSGE model. As discussed
in previous sections, the mean of the tax multiplier implied by the Blanchard-Perotti and
Romer-Romer models is quite close to the true multiplier of 1.8. But, as the top panel of
the table shows, the short sample uncertainty surrounding both estimates is quite large,
as reﬂected in the standard deviation of the multiplier estimates over the 1,000 samples.
19Table 2: Small Sample Properties of the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer Tax Multiplier
Conditional on the Correct Identiﬁcation of Tax Shocks
Horizon mBP mRR Probability
(qrt.) Mean Median Std.Dev. Mean Median Std.Dev. mRR >m BP mRR − mBP > 2
Sample Size 250 Quarters
10 1.71 1.64 0.96 1.88 1.90 2.04 0.53 0.17
11 1.69 1.62 0.97 1.90 1.94 2.04 0.54 0.17
12 1.65 1.59 0.97 1.90 1.85 2.04 0.55 0.18
Sample Size 1000 Quarters
10 1.80 1.79 0.47 1.82 1.74 0.95 0.48 0.02
11 1.79 1.78 0.47 1.83 1.77 0.94 0.50 0.01
12 1.77 1.75 0.47 1.83 1.75 0.94 0.50 0.02
Note: mBP and mRR stand for the tax multipliers implied by the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-
Romer models, respectively. All statistics are computed from 1000 samples of artiﬁcial data
generated from the DSGE model.
The Romer-Romer multiplier estimate appears to be substantially more vulnerable to small-
sample uncertainty. Its associated standard deviation is twice as large as the one associated
with the Blanchard-Perotti estimate. This suggests that, conditional on the ability of both
models to correctly identify exogenous tax shocks, the Blanchard-Perotti model delivers a
more eﬃcient estimate of the tax multiplier.
The penultimate column of table 2 shows that the estimated Romer-Romer tax multiplier
can be larger or smaller than the Blanchard-Perotti multiplier with almost equal probability.
The last column shows that the probability that in a sample of 250 quarters the Romer-
Romer multiplier is two percentage points larger than the Blanchard-Perotti multiplier (as
estimated in actual data) is 17 percent. This means that one cannot reject the hypothesis
that, conditional on correct identiﬁcation, the observed diﬀerences in estimated tax multi-
pliers is due to small sample uncertainty.
The bottom panel of table 2 suggests that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of
tax shocks, both the Blanchard-Perotti and Romer-Romer reduced-form models produce
consistent estimates of the tax multiplier. As the number of observations increases from 250
to 1000 quarters, the standard deviations of both estimates fall by half, and the probability
20of observing a Romer-Romer multiplier that exceeds the Blanchard-Perotti multiplier by two
percentage points falls from 17 percent to 2 percent.
6 Hybrid Speciﬁcations
In a recent contribution, Favero and Giavazzi (2010) augment the Blanchard-Perotti model
by including the Romer-Romer shock as a regressor. They then compute the tax multiplier
induced by an innovation in the Romer-Romer shock. Favero and Giavazzi ﬁnd that the size
of the multiplier is around unity, in line with the results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).1
They argue that their combined model is the best approach to measure tax multipliers. The
key premise of their paper is that both the Blanchard-Perotti and the Romer-Romer models
correctly identify exogenous tax innovations. They interpret their ﬁndings, therefore, as
suggesting that the Romer-Romer single-equation model fails to capture the transmission of
tax shocks onto output.
We have shown that conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of tax shocks, both the
Blanchard-Perotti and the Romer-Romer models produce the correct transmission mech-
anism and tax multipliers on average. We have also shown, again conditional on correct
identiﬁcation, that the Blanchard-Perotti model yields more eﬃcient estimates of the tax
multiplier than does the Romer-Romer model when small sample uncertainty is taken into
account. In light of these ﬁndings, we analyze the Favero-Giavazzi speciﬁcation along two
dimensions, namely, bias and eﬃciency of the estimated tax multiplier.







1Mertens and Ravn (2009) also estimate a hybrid speciﬁcation that combines a VAR system with the
Romer-Romer tax shock as a regressor. In their speciﬁcaiton, these auhors distinguish between anticipated
and unanticipated Romer-Romer shocks. Unlike Favero and Giavazzi (2010), Mertens and Ravn estimate a
tax multiplier of around 2 percent. This diﬀerence deserves study.
21Figure 6: Impulse Response to a Tax Innovation in the DSGE and Favero-Giavazzi Models

















































































where the notation is as in earlier sections. As in our previous Montecarlo exercises, we
estimate this version of the Favero-Giavazzi model 1,000 times. Each estimation uses a
sample of 250 quarters generated using the DSGE model. Figure 6 displays with solid lines
the response to a tax innovation implied by the DSGE model and with broken lines the
average response implied by the Favero-Giavazzi model. Like the Blanchard-Perotti and
Romer-Romer models, on average the Favero-Giavazzi model does a good job at uncovering
the transmission mechanism of tax innovations. We conclude that, conditional on the correct
identiﬁcation of the tax shock, the Favero-Giavazzi model produces an unbiased estimate of
the tax multiplier. In this respect, therefore, the reduced-form transmission mechanisms
invoked by the Blanchard-Perotti, Romer-Romer, and Favero-Giavazzi models are on equal
footing.
But is the Favero-Giavazzi estimate of the tax multiplier more eﬃcient than the one
produced by the Blanchard-Perotti or Romer-Romer models? We ﬁnd that for a sample size
of 250 quarters, the estimate of the tax multiplier at a horizon of 11 quarters implied by
the Favero-Giavazzi model has a standard deviation across the 1,000 samples of 1.1. This
ﬁgure is slightly larger than the standard deviation of 0.97 found for the Blanchard-Perotti
estimate and signiﬁcantly smaller than the standard deviation of the Romer-Romer estimate
22(see table 2). We conclude that, conditional on the correct identiﬁcation of the tax shock,
the Favero-Giavazzi model produces a more eﬃcient estimate than the Romer-Romer model,
but oﬀers no eﬃciency gains with respect to the Blanchard-Perotti model.
7 Conclusion
Since the revolutionary ideas of Keynes, governments have been ﬁghting recessions with
spending increases and tax cuts. The justiﬁcation of these policy measures often references
estimates oﬃscal multipliers. But the literature on the size of ﬁscal multipliers, be it tax
or government spending multipliers, does not speak with one voice. The VAR literature
delivers tax multipliers of about one percent, whereas the narrative literature produces tax
multipliers of about three percent. These diﬀerences are sizable enough to leave policymakers
without a clear guidance on the power of tax cuts to stimulate the economy.
The VAR and narrative approaches diﬀer along two important dimensions. One is the
assumed transmission mechanism. The second is the methodology for identifying tax shocks.
This paper uses a micro-founded data-generating process to evaluate the hypothesis that
diﬀerences in estimated tax multipliers are due to diﬀerences in the assumed transmission
mechanism. In testing this hypothesis, it is assumed that both methodologies identify the
same tax shock. The main ﬁnding of this paper is that this hypothesis is rejected. Both
reduced-from models correctly uncover the size of the underlying tax multiplier.
Our results leave open two alternative explanations for the observed diﬀerences in es-
timated tax multipliers. One is small sample uncertainty. Accordingly, we explore the
small-sample properties of the estimated tax multipliers stemming from the VAR and nar-
rative models. We ﬁnd that, conditional on both models identifying the same tax shock,
small sample uncertainty is large. In fact, small sample uncertainty accounts for all of the
observed diﬀerences in estimated tax multipliers according to our data generating process.
All of the results reported in this investigation are conditional on the assumption that
23the VAR and narrative approaches successfully identify exogenous innovations in taxes. An
alternative explanation of the observed diﬀerences in estimates of tax multipliers is, of course,
that the two methodologies fail to identify the same tax shock. We believe that this alter-
native warrants future investigation.
24References
Blanchard, Olivier and Roberto Perotti, “An Empirical Characterization of the Dynamic
Eﬀects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 117, November 2002, 1329-1368.
Favero, Carlo, and Francesco Giavazzi, “VAR-BAsed and Narrative Measures of the Tax
Multiplier,” manuscript, Universita Bocconi, May 2010.
Mertens, Karel, and Morten O. Ravn, “Empirical Evidence on the Aggregate Eﬀects of
Anticipated and Unanticipated U.S. Tax Policy Shocks,” Cornell University, 2009.
Romer, Christina, and David H. Romer, “The Macroeconomic Eﬀects of Tax Changes:
Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” NBER Working Paper No. 13264,
July 2007.
Schmitt-Groh´ e, Stephanie and Mart´ ın Uribe, “What’s News in Business Cycles,” Columbia
University, April 2010a.
Schmitt-Groh´ e, Stephanie and Martin Uribe, “Business Cycles With A Common Trend in
Neutral and Investment-Speciﬁc Productivity,” NBER Working Paper No. 16071, June
2010b.
25